Islamic Revolutionary Guard Military - World Jewish Congress
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Understanding its branches, structures and goals

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Military

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Name Size
Regular Forces (Artesh) 150,000
IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF) 15,000
IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF) 5,000
Basij (Reserves) 450,000
Total (excl. Basij) 190,000
Total (incl. Basij) 640,000
Regular Forces (Artesh)
Name Size
Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force (IRIGF) 350,000
Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) 18,000
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) 37,000
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force (IRIADF) 450,000
Total (excl. Basij) 15,000
Total 420,000
Note: Basij number only includes estimated active reserve personnel; Iran may be able to mobilize an additional 500,000 to 1 million Basij in wartime.

IRGC Quds Force

The Quds force (or Jerusalem Force) is the elite IRGC unit that specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence extraterritorial operations. The Qud’s force is the main tool by which the Iranian regime sows chaos and destruction across the Middle East.[i] The Quds Force is the main operator in the field and subsequently the most significant part of the argument connecting their activity to terrorism that would lead to designation.

The Quds force is described as the successor to the Shah’s Imperial Guards. The force actively participates in deadly and malign proxy activity. Importantly, the Quds Force supports non-state actors in many countries as part of Iranian military strategy. For instance, in 1982, a Quds unit was deployed to Lebanon where it assisted in the founding of Hezbollah.[ii] The Quds force participated in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Argentine Jewish Community Centre in Buenos Aires, killing 85 people and wounding hundreds.[iii]

Quds engagement includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas, Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan.[iv]

The Quds Force reports directly to Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. 

After Qassem Soleimani  was assassinated on January 3rd 2020 at Baghdad International Airport, he was replaced by his deputy Esmail Ghaani. The United States government designated the IRGC including the Quds Force as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) in April 2020 based on the IRGC’s “continued support to and engagement in terrorist activity around the world.”[v]  Significantly, this was the first designation by the United States of another government’s department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation.

The IRGC via the Quds Force, broadens its influence, terror operations and espionage via its educational infrastructure. The Iran-based Al-Mustafa International University supports dozens of branches internationally that facilitate Quds Force operations via the recruitment of international students, Americans included.[vi] Both the Quds force and the Basij are primarily responsible for IRGC recruitment. Recruitment is also done near holy sites, mosques, community centres and schools.

Through means such as these, the Iranian regime and the IRGC Quds Force promote international instability by exploiting conflicts throughout the Middle Ease and coerce vulnerable individuals to commit terrorist acts on behalf of the Iranian regime.[vii]

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the IRGC and Quds Force are Iran’s “primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.”[viii]  A 2010 Pentagon report describes the global reach of the Quds Force and states that it “maintains operational capabilities around the world,” and “it is well established in the Middle East and North Africa and recent years have witnessed an increased presence in Latin America, particularly Venezuela.”[ix]  Further, the report concluded that if “U.S. involvement in conflict in these regions deepens, contact with the IRGC-QF, directly or through extremist groups it supports, will be more frequent and consequential.”[x] Illustrating this point, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 2012 reportedly ordered the Quds Force to step up attacks against Western targets in retaliation for U.S.-backing of Syrian rebels in that country’s civil war.[xi]

Basij

The Basij, or Sazeman-e Basij-e Mostazafan, Organisation for the Mobilisation of the Oppressed is a paramilitary volunteer militia founded by the order of Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979 that operates under the IRGC. Practically, the Basij is seen as the eyes and ears of the Iranian regime. It is an auxiliary force with various responsibilities, especially internal security, law enforcement, special religious or political events and morality policing. The Basij have branches in virtually every city and town in Iran.

It is argued that there are at least 4 million and perhaps over 5 million volunteer members of the Basij. Studies show that that one in three students is a member, as well as 65% of state employees.[xiii]

The Basij have become more important since the disputed 2009 election. Due to domestic demands for reform and anticipating economic hardships from international sanctions, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has rallied the Basij to counter perceived threats to the regime such as protests.[xiv]

IRGC Aerospace Force

The IRGC Aerospace Force (IRGCASF) develops and operates Iran's arsenal of ballistic missiles through the IRGC Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization and the IRGC Aerospace Force al-Ghadir Missile Command; part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Aerospace Force is also responsible for Iran’s air defence with the Iranian Air Force. The Aerospace Force also serves as the primary operator of Iran's fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which receives technical support from Rayan Roshd Afzar; has deployed UAVs to Iraq and Syria.[xv]

The IRGCASF provides close air support and lift capabilities with military aircraft and helicopters as well as commercially owned aircraft under the IRGCASF’s control. The IRGCASF is a relatively small force of approximately 15,000 personnel. Although the IRGC’s manned aviation component historically focused on airlift and logistic support, its mission evolved to include a squadron of its own combat aircraft after Iran began incorporating Iraqi aircraft evacuated to Iran in 1991 during the First Gulf War.

It is notable to follow Iran’s use of UAVs. UAVs are Iran’s most rapidly progressing air capability. Iran uses UAVs, which are very versatile, for a variety of missions. The IRGCASF has also deployed various armed and unarmed UAVs to Syria and Iraq to support counter-ISIS operations and the Syrian regime. In 2018, Iran for the first time employed UAVs to conduct long-range, cross-border strike operations, using armed UAVs in concert with ballistic missiles as part of a retaliatory attack against ISIS in eastern Syria. Iran has also provided UAV platforms and technology to Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen to challenge its regional rivals.[xvi]

IRGC Navy

The IRGC Navy (IRGCN) was established by Ayatollah Khomeini in September 1985. The IRGC Navy and the regular Iranian (‘Artesh’) Navy, like other wings of the Iranian military, overlap functions and areas of responsibility, but they are different in terms of how they are equipped and trained and most notably their fighting tactics. The IRGCN has a large arsenal of small fast attack craft, and specializes in asymmetric warfare, with hit-and-run attacks as the method of choice. The IRGCN operates tactically like a guerrilla force at sea, and maintains large arsenals of coastal defense and anti-ship cruise missiles and mines.[xvii] It has also a special-forces unit ‘Takavar’, called the Sepah Navy Special Force (S.N.S.F.).

The IRGCN’s asymmetric tactics and broader predatory policies have meant that they have had a great number of interactions with international navies such as the Royal Navy and the United States Navy. Some of the most recent examples include ןn 2019, when the IRGC Navy allegedly carried out a series of attacks on international vessels in the Gulf of Oman and seized vessels taking them to Iran. [xviii] As a result, the United States started the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), which increases overall surveillance and security in key waterways in the Middle East. The IRGCN has also been blamed for the 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities, with Iran denying all charges.

Most recently, in September 2020, Iran announced a new naval base, underlining new security danger and further threats to world shipping. The new IRGCN base would aim to demonstrate dominance over the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.  The "Martyr Seyed Majid Rahbar" base lies in the southern province of Hormozgan, near the entrance to the narrow Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of world oil output passes.[xix]

Ground Forces

The IRGC’s Ground Forces do not only play a conventional military role, but are also more geared towards internal disorder than the regular army. However, in more recent years, the IRGC Ground Forces and by extension the entire IRGC, have transitioned to becoming an expeditionary force, capable of and intending to project power abroad, through conventional military operations or via proxies and unconventional warfare. There are at least around 150,000 IRGC Ground Force troops.[xx]

IRGC Intelligence Organization

The IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO) was established in October 2009 following the mass anti-government protests. It is Iran’s foremost military intelligence service, capable of all-source collection, analysis, and investigations and also exercises primary dominance over internal Iranian military intelligence. It is said by regime opponents to be more conservative and more violent than the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. The leader of the IRGC-IO reports directly to the Supreme Leader, but must also act in coordination with the IRGC Commander.[xxi]  The IRGC-IO’s main aims include: foiling terrorism, foiling political dissent, active suppression of protests, preventing the inclusion of Western cultural influence, arresting dual nationals, and the kidnapping of Iranian government opponents outside Iran. It is also said that the IRGC-IO oversees the cyber warfare of the IRGC. [xxii]

[i] https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-irgc-facilitators-in-iran-and-an-irgc-official-in-yemen/

[ii] Moghadam, Assaf (2011). Militancy and Political Violence in Shiism: Trends and Patterns. Routledge. p. 87. ISBN 978-1136663536Archived from the original on 13 October 2017.

[iii] https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/irgc-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps

[iv] Operational Environment Assessment (OEA) Team (April 2010). "Operational Environment Assessment: Iran". Ft. Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats, US Army. This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army

[v]  "Country Reports on Terrorism 2019" (PDF). Country Reports.

[vi] https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-irgc-facilitators-in-iran-and-an-irgc-official-in-yemen/

[vii] https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-irgc-facilitators-in-iran-and-an-irgc-official-in-yemen/

[viii] Greg Bruno, “State Sponsors: Iran,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 13, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362.

[ix] Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Qods Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/.

[x] Bill Gertz, “Iran Boosts Qods Shock Troops in Venezuela,” Washington Times, April 21, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/21/iran-boosts-qods-shock-troops-in-venezuela/.

[xi] https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/irgc-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps

[xii] https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/irgc-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps

[xiii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/sep/08/basij-militia-and-social-control-in-iran-book-interview

[xiv] https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force

[xv] https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-irgc-aerospace-force

[xvi] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf

[xvii] Michael Connell (12 March 2013), Gulf III: Iran's Power in the Sea Lanes, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace.

[xviii]  Iranian republican guard seizes foreign oil tanker persian abcnews.go.com

[xix] https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/1600954938-iran-unveils-new-naval-base-near-strategic-strait-of-hormuz?fbclid=IwAR1F1pPP3SpPM6k2HDN84j3_BhWg5Zr1R0sfxqiDcLv7BX-yjTpy0VySZUM    SEPT 24th 2020 i24 News

[xx] http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_iran.pdf

[xxi] https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf

[xxii] https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/he/ארגון-המודיעין-של-משמרות-המהפכה-מנגנו/?fbclid=IwAR2H-RAxNC1Iyx3cX5Efj8lhRsw8vbt5Z5OjMlh_eLQUBiDEK_ca5UXo9cc

IRGC and IRGC Quds Force terrorism worldwide: